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ACCOUNTING FOR INTERNED 
JAPANESE-AMERICAN CIVILIANS 
DURING WORLD WAR II: CREATING 
INCENTIVES AND ESTABLIHING 
CONTROLS FOR CAPTIVE WORKERS
Abstract: On February 19, 1942, following the attack on Pearl Har-
bor and the declaration of war against Japan, President Roosevelt is-
sued Executive Order 9066 which empowered the Secretary of War 
to exclude “any and all persons” from designated areas in the United 
States. Shortly thereafter, some 120,000 civilians of Japanese descent 
were prohibited from living, working, or traveling on the West Coast. 
By October 1942, over 100,000 “evacuees” were relocated and con-
fined to ten remote internment camps for the duration of the war.
 The War Relocation Authority (WRA) administered these camps 
and had the responsibility to feed, house, educate, and provide em-
ployment for the evacuees. This article describes the WRA’s use of ac-
counting information and situates the role of accounting within a la-
bor-process framework. It initially discusses labor-process theory and 
provides an overview of the internment episode and cooperative ac-
counting in the U.S. It then focuses on particular accounting policies, 
procedures, and reports that were used by the WRA to manage en-
terprises, monitor internment activities, and socialize evacuees with 
American capitalistic values. 
Acknowledgments: The authors are grateful to participants in conferences 
where earlier drafts of this paper were presented – the Cardiff Business School, 
the World Congress of Accounting Historians, and the American Accounting As-
sociation (Orlando and San Francisco). We are particularly grateful to AHJ ed-
itor-emeritus, Steve Walker, for overseeing the review process of this article de-
spite his having completed his editorial duties with the last issue. Thanks also to 
two very conscientious AHJ reviewers. Funding support from the Jack Wasmer 
Fellowship at John Carroll University is also acknowledged.
1
Tyson and Fleischman: Accounting for interned Japanese-American civilians during World War II: Creating incentives and establishing controls for captive workers
Published by eGrove, 2006
Accounting Historians Journal, June 2006168  
INTRODUCTION1
 The December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor triggered the 
most racially prejudicial, federal governmental action in modern 
American history. As a response to the attack, Japanese and Jap-
anese-American civilians were forcibly relocated to internment 
camps for the duration of the war. The 1940 Census identified 
126,947 U.S. residents of Japanese ancestry, 112,353 of whom 
lived in the Western Defense Command states of Arizona, Cal-
ifornia, Oregon, and Washington. Approximately two-thirds of 
these Japanese Americans had been born in the U.S. Eventu-
ally 104,000 of them (officially called “evacuees”) were forcibly 
resettled into ten remote relocation centers (RCs), while 8,000 
others voluntarily took up residence outside the western states 
[“Notes on the Japanese in the United States,” Entry 16, box 
498, folder 79.100 #1]. While the stated rationale for relocation 
was national security, there was not one documented case of es-
pionage or sabotage by a Japanese American prior to their in-
ternment.
 From March 1942 until the end of the war, the immense-
ly complex issues associated with the control and administra-
tion of the RCs was handled by the War Relocation Authority 
(WRA), a badly understaffed governmental agency that was cre-
ated for this purpose. This article will examine the great vari-
ety of matters with which the WRA was forced to deal, ranging 
from the administration of the ten RCs, the creation of busi-
ness enterprises, and the resettlement of evacuees into employ-
ment opportunities further east. In our view, the WRA estab-
lished cooperative business enterprises, as opposed to ones that 
were WRA or privately owned, in part to monitor, manage, and 
socialize a captive population (i.e., control the labor process) 
given the WRA’s very limited resources within a wartime econ-
omy. In the context of these enterprises, as well as the WRA’s 
ongoing reporting requirements, accounting information played 
a crucial role in the internment episode. 
 The article is organized as follows. We initially discuss 
 labor-process theory in terms of exactly what it says about con-
trol and the use of accounting information. We next describe 
the cooperative enterprises that were established at the RCs. 
We then provide an overview of the internment episode, giving 
particular emphasis to some of its racial aspects. There follows 
1All primary-source records we examined are located in Record Group 210, 
Entries 1, 3, 16, 29, and 48 at the National Archives of the United States in Wash-
ington, DC.
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then a rather lengthy description of the mass of data that the 
WRA was charged to collect, either by virtue of its own deci-
sion or by fiat from higher governmental authorities. A substan-
tial amount of the documentation was prepared by WRA statis-
ticians and accountants and illustrates labor-process theory in 
action, albeit in the tightly controlled, non-market setting of in-
ternment camps. We conclude by describing how this episode 
and its use of accounting and cost-control procedures support 
labor-process theory.
LABOR-PROCESS THEORY
 According to Friedman [1978], labor process necessarily in-
volves resistance between workers and owner/managers and re-
quires that emergent administrative controls and procedures re-
sult from a dynamic process of interaction between these two 
competing groups. Labor-process theory has been helpful in un-
derstanding the interface between workplace dynamics and the 
use of accounting information. Labor process has also been the 
subject of a number of noteworthy studies by accounting and 
labor historians alike, although none of these studies examined 
cooperative businesses in controlled, non-market settings. For 
example, Nelson [1975] described the role of contractors as in-
termediaries in large, 19th century factories. Clawson [1980] 
and Hopper and Armstrong [1991] described how owner/man-
agers sought to dominate and disempower workers in early and 
mid-20th century industries. Braverman [1974] applied Marx-
ist theory to explain the inevitable workplace conflict between 
workers and owner/managers that crosses national boundaries, 
time periods, and industry settings.
 The labor-process literature of the past three decades 
has furnished considerable insight into traditional labor-
 management relationships, although interactions between Jap-
anese-American evacuees and governmental administrators can 
hardly be called “traditional.” Braverman’s Labor and Monopo-
ly Capital [1974] was the catalyst for an outpouring of support, 
revision, and rebuttal. Braverman’s history of U.S. labor con-
trol emphasized a series of devices (piece rates, internal con-
tracting, deskilling) deployed by management to exploit a ho-
mogeneous work force he perceived, in best Marxist tradition, 
to be in class conflict with capital. Later theorists have cri-
tiqued Braverman on three issues – (1) his failure to take into 
account worker resistance, (2) his assumption of labor’s homo-
geneity, and (3) his focus on the exploitative aspects of capi-
3
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tal (management). Gordon et al. [1982], Thompson [1989], and 
Greenbaum [1994] all wrote that the heterogeneity of the labor 
force, reflected in the diversity of its origins and its ethnic an-
tagonisms, among other factors, reduced the resistance of la-
bor towards management and kept the movement divided. 
 Another compelling argument, and one more germane to 
the Japanese internment episode, was Burawoy’s [1979, 1985] 
demonstration of the community of interests between labor and 
management that has led to a consensual voluntarism on the 
part of workers collectively. Burawoy [1985, p. 28] wrote: “His-
tory suggests, however, that the outcome of class struggle mol-
lifies the opposition of interests and frequently coordinates the 
interests of capital and labor.” This diminished antagonism has 
also been highlighted in the labor-process analyses of Littler 
and Salaman [1982] and Knights and Willmott [1990]. Certain-
ly, accounting has a role to play in making labor systems work, 
be they in captive or market-based environments. As Hopper et 
al. [1986] suggested from a Marxist perspective, the reporting 
structures of accounting and its modes of calculation provide a 
technology to harness the compliance of labor. Similarly, from 
a Foucauldian perspective, the knowledge generated from the 
accounting system permits the efficient wielding of power by 
governmental and business administrators. 
 As we illustrate in later sections of the paper, the relation-
ship between WRA administrators and the thousands of con-
fined evacuee workers and managers generally evidenced both 
cooperation and voluntarism during the three-year internment 
period.2 Thus, the next section of the paper offers a new exam-
ple to support labor-process theory – the cooperative business 
enterprises that were established at the internment camps. Also 
included are brief remarks about the history of cooperatives in 
the U.S.
COOPERATIVE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
 On March 18, 1942, the WRA was established to adminis-
ter, maintain, and control all aspects of life at the ten perma-
nent RCs, tasks that must have appeared daunting given that the 
WRA’s top officials had no experience with mass relocations of 
2We would be remiss not to point out two major acts of disobedience that 
did occur at the RCs in late 1942: the Poston strike and the Manzanar riot. See 
Okihiro [1973] for details on these particular incidents.
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this magnitude.3 WRA administrators had to act quickly to as-
semble a staff and create policies for the housing, feeding, edu-
cating, and employment of some 100,000 detained individuals 
of all ages in communities of between 5,000 and 20,000 evacu-
ees that would be maintained temporarily, but indefinitely, un-
til the war ended. The RCs were intended to be as self-sustain-
ing as possible given the constraints of a wartime economy and 
the existing prejudice against any policy that appeared to favor 
Japanese evacuees over “native” American citizens. For exam-
ple, evacuee wage rates were capped at $19 per month so that 
they fell below the $21 that was initially paid to American mil-
itary personnel. 
 The decision to structure the centers’ business enterprises 
as cooperative associations was made in May 1942, soon after 
the WRA was established. According to Dillon S. Myer [1971, p. 
41], director of the WRA from June 1942 until the end of the 
interment, “… the WRA had hit upon a formula that it hoped 
would be a stimulant to work performance, would not be cost-
ly, and would be acceptable to the public.” Cooperative associ-
ations were a common form of enterprise and were especially 
popular in the agricultural regions of California. According to 
Kerr and Harris [1939], self-help cooperatives were first estab-
lished in the early 1930s when the federal government provid-
ed financial assistance to stimulate capital formation during the 
economic depression.4 Barter cooperatives were initially creat-
ed for services such as barber shops, sewing rooms, and crop 
distribution. They reached a peak in popularity in 1933 with 
176 different groups and over 30,000 members [Kerr and Har-
ris, 1939, p. 4]. The Wagner-Lewis Relief Act of 1933 stimulat-
ed the development of production cooperatives principally for 
baking, canning, gardening, and sewing products. In the late 
1930s, the Works Progress Administration (WPA) received gov-
ernment funding to aid cooperatives in conjunction with the 
1938 Federal Relief Act. Jones and Schneider [1984, p. 57] not-
ed over 500,000 families and 600 cooperatives had been formed 
in 37 states between 1931 and 1938, and that self-help produc-
3The names and locations of the ten sites were: Central Utah – Topaz UT; 
Colorado River – Poston AZ; Gila River – Rivers AZ; Heart Mountain – Heart 
Mountain WY; Jerome – Denson AR; Manzanar – Manzanar CA; Minidoka – 
Hunt ID; Rohwer – McGhee AR; Tule Lake – Newell CA; Granada – Amache CO.
4“A self-help production cooperative may be defined as a democratic asso-
ciation of the unemployed and underemployed who have organized to obtain 
the necessities of life through their own production of goods” [Kerr and Harris, 
1939, p. 1]. 
5
Tyson and Fleischman: Accounting for interned Japanese-American civilians during World War II: Creating incentives and establishing controls for captive workers
Published by eGrove, 2006
Accounting Historians Journal, June 2006172  
tion cooperatives “represent the only major historical attempt 
by the U.S. legislature to incorporate workers’ participation in 
management into government programs.”
 By their nature, cooperatives draw on their membership for 
managers and governance, a structure ideally suited to the RCs 
because of the WRA’s limited resources, the RCs’ remote loca-
tions, the shortage of professionally trained managers, and the 
need to start business enterprises quickly to service the thou-
sands of captive persons. Further, the decision to pay most cap-
tive workers the same basic wage and to distribute a portion 
of the surplus to them were common practices among self-help 
cooperatives. In the case of the RC cooperatives, a portion of 
any surpluses generated by the enterprises above the direct costs 
for materials and the cash advanced to evacuees would revert 
back to the WRA as partial repayment for the fair value of the 
food, shelter, medical care, and other services provided by the 
government. The balance of the surplus would be distributed to 
the evacuees in the form of additional cash advances. Accord-
ing to Myer [1971, p. 41], accounting data played a critical role 
in determining the surplus: 
The policy further provided that a full accounting would 
be kept of maintenance costs on the one hand and the 
income from the sale of products surplus to the cen-
ter needs on the other, and appraisals would be made of 
the increases in capital values of land and structures.
 As mentioned, the decision to structure the RC businesses 
as cooperative enterprises was made early by WRA administra-
tors.5 Cooperatives would utilize evacuee workers and manag-
ers to produce clothing goods and provide laundry, dry clean-
ing, shoe repair, and other needed services. In a May 25, 1942 
letter, Harvey M. Coverley, assistant regional director of the 
WRA, stated that, “a definite decision had been reached to the 
effect that all consumer services on relocation centers will be 
managed by cooperative associations.” Coverley also outlined 
the guiding principles for the cooperatives [Entry 16, box 421, 
folder 69.014]:
1. All cooperatives will be owned by their members.
2. Each member will have only one vote in membership 
meetings regardless of the number of shares owned.
5Myer [1971, p. 46] noted that three different plans were considered: “(1) 
WRA management of shops and services, (2) granting of concessions to private 
operators, or (3) management by the residents on a consumer cooperative ba-
sis.”
6
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3. All goods shall be sold for cash.
4. Lowest prevailing market prices shall be charged.
5. A certain percentage of profits shall be set up in re-
serves for cooperative education.
6. Any profits distributed to members as dividends shall 
be in proportion to the total number of shares out-
standing and number of shares owned by each mem-
ber.
7. All labor employed by cooperatives shall be treated 
fairly.
 The WRA’s long-term policy for operating the cooperatives 
emerged from a conference in late August 1942. In addition to 
specifying the standards of organization, dividend distribution, 
and merchandise pricing, the WRA also established uniform ac-
counting procedures and a set of accounts that “should be regu-
larly audited” [Myer, 1971, p. 46]. Clearly, these enterprises op-
erated at a far lower total cost than if they had been staffed 
by non-Japanese-American employees and operated as privately 
owned canteens. Using evacuee workers also allowed the WRA 
to reduce out-of-pocket expenditures, while any work done for 
private industry (i.e., contract labor) would be charged at pre-
vailing prices.
 The WRA’s fiscal 1943 appropriation request included $4 
million for establishing cooperatives, but, according to Myer, 
this entire expenditure was best viewed as a loan that “will 
be repaid to the Government in full” [Entry 16, box 37, folder 
12.100]. Of course, the evacuees were strongly opposed to re-
paying the government for these cash advances, arguing that 
persons who had been relocated against their wills should not 
be burdened with the cost of basic services.6
 Each business cooperative (e.g., Community Enterprises, 
Inc.) was registered in the state in which each RC was locat-
ed.7 They were run by Japanese-American managers who were 
selected by the WRA for their skill and expertise, since a num-
ber of evacuees were college educated and many had experi-
ence running small businesses prior to the evacuation order. 
6According to a February 19, 1943 memorandum from Taizo Inazu, presi-
dent of the Board of Directors of the Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises: “The 
evacuees have often been reminded that it was the duty and responsibility of the 
War Relocation Authority to provide evacuees with the three essentials of living: 
food, clothing and shelter” [Entry 48, box 228, folder 69.030].
7As of December 1943, eight of the ten enterprises had been set up as coop-
eratives; another (Gila River) was in the process of reapplying for state approv-
al; and another (Heart Mountain) continued to operate as a trust [Entry 16, box 
216, folder 24.040 #4].
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These managers fell under the supervision of one or two WRA 
staff advisors and were given a monopoly (in exchange for a 
monthly rental fee) for furnishing the goods and services not 
supplied by the government. According to a typical letter from 
the head of the WRA’s Community Management Division to a 
potential supplier, “[the corporations] must follow an account-
ing system prescribed by [the] Gov; must agree to accumulate 
adequate reserves before distributing profits; and must agree 
to using a mark-up system that will permit them to operate on 
a sound business basis” [Entry 16, box 416, folder 69.010 #1]. 
According to an August 25, 1942 WRA policy statement, con-
sumer cooperative enterprises were to be given exclusive rights 
to operate at all ten RCs. The enterprises were expected to fol-
low WRA procedures for pricing, merchandising, and distribut-
ing dividends. They were also required to obtain regular audits 
of their accounts and financial reports [Myer, 1971]. Patrons 
who purchased additional shares in the cooperatives were en-
titled to receive a portion of the cooperative’s profits as divi-
dends, but only after the monthly cash advances for clothing 
(between $2.00 and $3.75 per month) had been repaid to the 
government.
 One WRA internal report indicated that as of June 30, 1944, 
a total of $1,131,740.22 in patronage rebates had been declared 
and that $580,306.23 had been actually distributed to evacuees.8 
As of December 31, 1944, there were 36,696 members out of 
an aggregate population of 80,003 that still resided at the RCs. 
There were a total of 166 shops and services, employing 1,825 
evacuees. While the number of employees may seem small, it 
should be noted that the WRA directly employed evacuees in 
mess halls, camp maintenance, police, fire, and sanitation de-
partments, and other basic services. For 1943, total enterpris-
es sales were $7.52 million, with net profit of $913,000. Corre-
sponding numbers for 1944 were $7.13 million and $910,000 
[Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010 #4].
 Community services such as dry cleaning, beauty shops, 
barber shops, and shoe repair were among those that were 
operated as cooperative enterprises. Operating costs included 
the material cost of purchased goods, staff wages, and facility 
rental charges of either $.235 cents per square foot per year 
8There was a significant difference among the various projects as to the per-
centage of dividends actually paid. Jerome paid all it had declared ($105,036.36), 
while Poston declared $215,044.81 but paid only $39,558.41[Entry 16, box 417, 
folder 69.010 #4]. According to Myer [1971, p. 47], a total of $2,298,820 was dis-
tributed in patronage dividends out of $21,890,167 in gross revenues.
8
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for unheated or $.28 per square foot for heated facilities 
[WRA Administrative Manual, Entry 29, box 3].9 According to 
WRA officials, the payment of rent entitled the cooperatives to 
operate as monopolies and precluded individual evacuees from 
charging for services provided to other evacuees [Entry 48, box 
230, folder 75.000]. As mentioned, the difference between an 
enterprise’s revenues and operating costs would be distributed 
to members of the association only after the government’s cash 
advances had been repaid.
 In October 1942, the National Society of Co-operative Ac-
countants (NSCA) proposed setting up a uniform accounting 
system for the War Relocation Co-operative Enterprises for a 
fee of $15,000 or $1.50-2.00 per hour plus travel and expenses. 
The proposal was rejected by Otto Rossman of the Communi-
ty Enterprise Section of the WRA who indicated that the WRA 
planned to use in-house staff to set up its accounting systems, 
although Rossman did indicate that the NSCA would be contact-
ed for follow-up audits [Entry 16, box 416, folder 69.010 #1].10 
The decision to use WRA and evacuee staff resulted in a range 
of accounting practices that lacked uniformity and clearly hin-
dered inter-project comparability. For example, the superintend-
ent of the Community Enterprises Section in Washington indi-
cated by letter to the acting superintendent of the Gila River 
Project [Entry 16, box 416, folder 69.010 #3]:
The control and system and auditing [at Gila River] is 
the best we have seen in cooperatives. If all the enter-
prises use the same system, we can then send out com-
parative reports. This is very difficult to do with differ-
ent types of reports, as you can well imagine. 
COOPERATIVE ACCOUNTING ON THE RCS
 Evidence reveals that the WRA used comparative financial 
information to help stimulate cost efficiency and instill a spir-
it of competitiveness among the RCs despite the lack of ac-
counting uniformity. For example, the WRA prepared semi-an-
nual reports that summarized the financial performance of the 
9Rent rates were revised downward in February 1943 to the above figures in 
response to complaint letters from evacuees at the Rohwer, Manzanar, and Tule 
Lake RCs [Entry 16, box 416, folder 69.010 #3].
10All RCs except for Granada were audited by the Northwest Cooperative Au-
diting and Service Association of Walla Walla WA. Granada was audited by the 
Consumers Cooperative Association of Kansas City [Entry 16, box 417, folder 
69.010 #6]. Box 418, folder D contains multiple copies of the accounting system 
set up by Northwest.
9
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centers’ business enterprises and focused on key performance 
indicators. Meeting key indicators, such as a three-to-one cur-
rent ratio, also triggered cash rebates to the evacuees and thus 
served as an inducement to meet the WRA’s financial targets. 
Detailed reports were prepared regularly to assess and compare 
the performance of each center. The semi-annual report ending 
December 31, 1943 included a section on business enterprises 
that contained the current ratios for all ten RCs, ranging from 
8.83 at Central Utah to 2.09 at Tule Lake. The report included 
the following comments about the financial performance of the 
business enterprises [“Semi-Annual Report, July 1 to December 
31, 1943,” Entry 3, box 6]:
During this period an effort was made to reach a ratio 
of current assets to current liabilities of 3 to 1. By the 
end of the year most of the Enterprises had hit this ra-
tio and the others were climbing steadily toward it. Sev-
eral of the Enterprises had established such good cash 
[positions] that they were able to pay a cash rebate just 
before the Christmas season. This, of course, is a fine 
morale builder at this particular time.
 Certain evacuee officers and managers of the project co-
operatives appeared similarly concerned with meeting financial 
targets despite not having the opportunity to benefit financial-
ly. For example, while noting that the Jerome cooperative was 
compelled to dissolve despite being rated as the best performer 
among the ten center co-ops, Katsujiro Iseri, president of the 
cooperative, discussed the following financial indicators in his 
year-end summary report [“History of the Jerome Co-Operative 
Enterprises, Inc.,” Entry 16, box 427, folder 69.020]11:
According to the report of the WRA Business Enter-
prises, the ratio of operating expenses to gross sales in 
the case of Jerome Co-Operative Enterprises, in com-
parison with the other center co-ops, is the third from 
the lowest. The ratio of net savings to gross sales is the 
second highest among center co-ops. The average ra-
tio of assets to liabilities of all center co-ops is 2.95 to 1, 
but ours is 5.01 to 1, which rates ours at the top.
 
11The archives also include a set of financial reports entitled “Combined Bal-
ance Sheet and Operating Statement of Business Enterprises Operating on Relo-
cation Centers.” Each of the ten projects is listed on the same page. The follow-
ing data are included: current ratio, total net savings, average monthly sales per 
employee, average sales per capita [Entry 16, box 429, folder 69.034].
10
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 Once the evacuees had been removed from the West Coast 
assembly centers (ACs) and relocated to permanent camps, dis-
persing evacuees to other regions of the country became one of 
the WRA’s policy goals. The archives reveal that certain WRA 
field officials tried very hard to relocate evacuee accountants 
who worked on the project cooperatives to other cooperatives 
further east. An exchange of letters between Don Elberson, chief 
of Consumer Enterprises at the Tule Lake Project, and Merlin 
G. Miller, director of the Education Department of the Consum-
ers Cooperative Association in Kansas City, reveals the difficul-
ty in accomplishing this goal given the prejudice against Japa-
nese Americans and the resistance to employ them.12
 Despite the difficulties mentioned above, and the relatively 
small number of resettlements, relocations of accounting per-
sonnel were sufficient to cause staff shortages to the degree that 
they impacted the quality of financial reporting. For example, 
the December 1943 semi-annual report noted that, “there is con-
stant turnover of personnel which is particularly serious in the 
accounting department where financial reports have to be sub-
mitted periodically” [“Semi-Annual Report, July 1 to December 
31, 1943,” Entry 3, box 6]. Similarly, a December 5, 1944 letter 
from Charles M. Beltt, business enterprise advisor to the head 
of the Business Enterprise Section in Washington DC, stated 
[Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010 #5]: 
As we all know, there has been a very fast turnover in 
the personnel of the Business Enterprises and in some 
instances the cooperatives have lost nearly all of their 
12On February 10, 1943, Elberson recommended three evacuees for employ-
ment. He spoke most highly for Mr. Tanaka, who, although an alien, “is very 
thoroughly Americanized” and “in terms of knowledge of accounting theory and 
practice and business organization, he has no peer on this project.” Later, in his 
three-page, typed letter, Elberson discussed the role of cooperatives in overcom-
ing the racial stereotyping that confronted skilled workers like Mr. Tanaka: “It is 
rather inconceivable to me that the employment of one of these people in an or-
ganization the size of C.C.A. could be sufficient to split your organization open 
on a racial question … It is true that the cooperative movement professes that it 
puts into practice racial tolerance where other groups merely talk about it. We, 
who attempt to sell the cooperative movement to the Japanese as an instrument 
to be used for their general welfare, have much of this point, and I feel that it 
is quite obvious that the cooperative movement itself has as much to gain from 
this as the Japanese.” Unfortunately, Elberson was not fully persuasive as Mill-
er’s February response indicates: “I, myself, am convinced by your argument, but 
this is not the case for our entire staff, and we do, here, usually work as a unit. 
Frankly, our situation is complicated by the fact that part of our staff and our 
employees come from a long mental background of the old slave-holding states 
psychology of color prejudice” [Entry 48, box 281, folder 516].
11
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accountants and other key employees, and they have 
been unable to fill these vacancies with qualified people. 
Beltt noted that employee turnover caused the financial state-
ments to contain errors and to lack uniformity for comparative 
purposes. This theme was frequently reinforced in the WRA ar-
chive. Emil Sekerak of Topaz wrote to Rossman in 1943, claim-
ing that the lateness of its financial statements and the RC’s fail-
ure to use the uniform reporting form were occasioned by the 
recent turnover of chief accountants three times [Entry 16, box 
417, folder 69.010 #4].
 In 1944, auditing had become so desperate in Communi-
ty Enterprises that Mr. Provinse, the head of the Division, em-
ployed George Mori, an evacuee, to travel from camp to camp 
doing auditing work. In a July 22, 1944 letter, Provinse said a 
precedent had been set for such an unusual action by the YMCA 
and the Red Cross [Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010 #4].
 With typical care and perspicacity, Myer drafted a 15-page 
guide for the liquidation of the cooperative enterprises as ear-
ly as January 1945 [Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010 #6]. The 
final version was dispatched to the project directors in August. 
In a September 19 memo, Rossman informed Myer that the 
accounting side of the liquidation was impossible as the “staff 
had melted away to almost nothing” [Entry 16, box 417, folder 
69.010 #6]. Nevertheless, the WRA utilized its financial reports, 
flawed as they were, to evaluate and compare the performance 
of project enterprises.
 Accounting information and financial reports also served a 
variety of managerial purposes at the RCs, including compara-
tive costing.13 Costs were also monitored to defend against the 
many critics of WRA policies and activities. For example, each 
center had to submit its planned menus to Washington for ap-
proval “to make sure that the public was adequately informed 
of WRA feeding policies and procedures” [CWRIC, 1997, p. 
163]. A June 14, 1943 letter from J.W. Clear, WRA budget and 
finance officer, to the project director at the Granada RC clear-
ly illustrates the importance of the Handbook, the level of re-
13The authors of the Handbook described its purposes thusly: “It is intended 
that the accounting records prescribed in this Handbook provide a means of pre-
paring adequate financial operating statements to permit: A substantial basis for 
budgetary estimates; adequate budgetary control; comparative operating costs 
as a tool of good management; costs of production to assist in intelligent indus-
trial planning and marketing; an adequate means of accounting for all funds ad-
vanced to the War Relocation Authority; a source for supplying information with 
a) the evacuees, b) other government agencies, c) the public.
12
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porting detail, and the degree of administrative accountability 
within the WRA [Entry 16, box 494, folder 72.520]: 
There should be no conflict of thought as to the prep-
aration of any monthly reports as the procedures pre-
scribed in the Finance Manual will govern all cases. We 
have, therefore, made the necessary changes in your re-
port as to the Total Number of Meals Served, etc. We 
are unable to check your figures for the daily average 
number of persons served for the month or by sepa-
rate mess halls. Will you please advise how you com-
puted the averages as shown. In the future will you also 
please support any deductions from the ‘Stores to Ac-
count For,’ which are covered by Survey Reports, by at-
taching copies of those reports to the Monthly Subsis-
tence Report.
 Because evacuee cash advances (i.e., wages) were capped 
far below comparable civilian wages, there were few economic 
incentives to induce workers to perform above minimum perfor-
mance levels.14 WRA policies initially specified that a job would 
be provided to every evacuee who was willing and able to work. 
In addition, evacuees were given food, clothing, housing, edu-
cation, and medical attention whether they worked or not, al-
though the business enterprises were required to reimburse the 
government for the allowances given to their employees.15 This 
meant that jobs were often overstaffed, and there were few pen-
alties that could be imposed for absenteeism, tardiness, or poor 
job performance. 
 In our view, the WRA responded to its charge by combining 
administrative mechanisms that included traditional, account-
ing reporting procedures, as specified in the Handbook, with a 
variety of more creative, non-market social factors that includ-
ed aspects of a less than fully democratic society. In a June 10, 
1942 memorandum to Thomas Holland, chief, Employment Di-
vision, a senior employment officer described the challenges 
confronting the WRA [Entry 16, box 492, folder 72.100]: 
14As an example of the wage disparity between Caucasian and evacuee work-
ers, the CWRIC [1997, p. 167] noted that, “a WRA librarian received $167 a 
month, while her evacuee staff received $16 a month.”
15According to the U.S. Department of the Interior [1975, p. 81], the deci-
sion to provide jobs to everyone who was willing and able to work led to “a num-
ber of glaring abuses – a great deal of overstaffing on evacuee jobs at some of the 
centers, creation of a large number of ‘boondoggling’ positions, and encourage-
ment of inertia and slack working habits among a large percentage of the evacu-
ee population.”
13
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In the Relocation Centers, at present, the ordinary in-
centives to work are largely lacking. The wage is small 
and the worker sees little prospect of being able to im-
prove his future position through present work or sac-
rifice. The people enjoy security of a kind but without 
freedom or future … Closely related to the lack of work 
incentives is the weak position of the Administration as 
employer. The ordinary employer holds a strong sanc-
tion over his employees in that he can terminate the 
employment and endanger the livelihood of an employ-
ee whose performance is not satisfactory to him. Con-
versely he can offer greater pay as a reward for more or 
better work. The WRA can do neither. Unless it is pre-
pared to resort to physical duress, the Administration is 
compelled to treat idlers nearly as well as the workers.
 Thus, notwithstanding the frustrations of inducing worker 
efficiency in the RC environment, the WRA staff collected ex-
tensive data on each individual worker’s job performance and 
maintained a personnel file on every evacuee who resided in 
them. They established cooperative associations as the form of 
enterprise best able to minimize costs, overcome work resist-
ance, and facilitate skill development that would enable WRA 
officials to disperse evacuees to other parts of the country. The 
WRA collected cost data as a way to stimulate efficiency in the 
absence of normal market mechanisms (layoffs, discharges, 
plant closings, etc.).
COST ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL PROCEDURES
 While many top WRA officials had administrative experi-
ence with isolated populations at the Department of Agricul-
ture or the Bureau of Indian Affairs [U.S. Department of the 
Interior, 1975, p. 83], the mass relocation of over 100,000 ci-
vilians to isolated camps must have represented an extraordi-
nary set of challenges. As a first step, the WRA had to prepare 
budget estimates and develop detailed administrative policies. 
The largest single item within the WRA’s fiscal 1943 budget of 
$70 million was an expenditure of $20 million for evacuee food 
costs. Although $.50 per person per day was the daily food al-
lowance initially proposed for the ACs, the WRA Handbook [En-
try 29, box 1, 20.2.8/9] reduced the allotment to $.45 per per-
son per day, in part because the RCs could provide foodstuffs 
from their cooperative farms. The overall cost was calculated at 
$1.20 per day for evacuees except at Tule Lake. Figure 1 illus-
trates the costing procedures that were proposed by WRA staff 
14
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to determine per-person food cost at the RCs. Although compa-
rable examples are not reproduced, this same level of account-
ing detail was proposed for estimating the costs of operating 
housing and sanitary facilities, laundry facilities, and the hos-
pital/dispensary. 
FIGURE 116 
Proposed Outline for Food Costs
Explanation of Accounts
10. Provision of food for evacuees other than those in hospital. Includes costs 
of food and of operation of kitchen, commissary, dining halls, and refrig-
eration and food storage facilities.
11.0 Direct Costs
 11.1 Food issued to kitchens, but not including food inventory held in 
warehouse
 11.2 Evacuee labor used directly in operating kitchen, commissary, re-
frigerator plant, etc. … but not including central office force
 11.3 Caucasian labor employed in this activity
 11.4 Freight on food issued to kitchen, but not including freight on food 
inventory
 11.5 Fuel for cooking and heating buildings and water
 11.6 Miscellaneous
12.0 Allocated Costs
 12.1 Water. A charge for water, prorated from the Center water account 
as nearly as possible on the basis of quantity consumed.
 12.2 Electricity. A charge for electric power and light, prorated from to-
tal electric power cost as nearly as possible according to consump-
tion.
 12.3 Garbage disposal. Proration as equitably as may be of total cost of 
garbage disposal for whole project.
 12.4 Trash disposal.
 12.5 Cartage. Charges incurred by WRA for cartage of food from rail-
road station to project, within project, prorated from project total 
for cartage as nearly as possible according to load.
 12.6 Office and general supervision. A pro rata charge for general office 
service not carried as a specific project expense.
13.0 Buildings: Maintenance and Repair. Includes items of a more or less re-
current nature, including labor, material, and supplies, incident to main-
taining in operating condition the buildings used for kitchens, dining 
room, and food storage, refrigeration, and preparation.
14.0 Equipment: Maintenance and Repair. [Same as above]
15.0 Investment Items. These are items of major outlay, usually recurring only 
infrequently, if at all, the cost of which must be spread over a considerable 
period rather than charged currently.
 15.1 Land cost, building construction and replacement of buildings used 
for … Includes replacement of complete units or substantial parts 
thereof, as in case of serious damage by fire or wind.
 15.2 Equipment cost, installation and replacement for …
16Letter on August 13, 1942 from Stauber, to Mr. Leland Barrows, executive 
officer, WRA [Entry 16, box 494, folder 72.520]. Stauber proposed that a summa-
ry form, based on these procedures, be prepared monthly with data reduced to a 
“per evacuee-day” cost basis. Stauber recommended a similar costing approach 
for housing and sanitary facilities, laundry facilities, and the hospital/dispensary.
15
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 The Finance Handbook contained WRA Form 202 – Revised 
which was entitled “Monthly Report of Administrative Mess Op-
eration” [Entry 29, box 5, Finance Handbook, 1945, Section EG]. 
This standard form was prepared at each RC and described how 
the average cost per meal was to be computed. Another state-
ment entitled “Comparative Mess Hall Food Costs” was to be 
prepared by each mess hall at a RC and was to supplement the 
center’s monthly report [Entry 29, box 5, Finance Handbook, 
1943, Sections E-G]. This supplemental report was to include 
columnar headings for the total number of meals served, the 
daily average number of rations served, the cost of food con-
sumed, the average food cost per ration, and remarks. Another 
statement, entitled “Comparative Mess Hall Labor Costs,” was 
to include columnar headings for the daily average number of 
rations served, the labor costs, the average labor cost per ration 
per month, and remarks. Clearly, these two statements served 
managerial purposes of promoting greater cost efficiency for 
mess hall operations.
 In addition to providing essential information for budgeting 
and cost control, a carefully proscribed, cost accounting meth-
odology enabled WRA officials to respond definitively to in-
quiries from the media, other federal agencies, government offi-
cials, and political critics of WRA policies. For example, data 
emanating from a comprehensive cost accounting system could 
explain the following response to an inquiry from Secretary of 
Labor Frances Perkins [Entry 16, box 494, folder 72.520]:
The policy of the War Relocation Authority, an agency 
of the Federal Government, requires payment by evacu-
ees of $4.69 per week to cover cost of food and lodging 
when such evacuees are engaged in private employment 
and taking meals and lodging on the project.
 Since a number of evacuees were well-educated and many 
had experience running groceries and other small businesses be-
fore their internment, the WRA could employ them in account-
ing positions at the centers. For example, of the 3,845 people 
listed as working at the Rohwer Center on May 11, 1943, 26 
were described as engaged in accounting activities. The fact that 
only a $3 monthly wage differential existed between the con-
troller and the lowest level clerk clearly illustrates the challeng-
es the WRA faced in creating economic work incentives. The 
breakdown of these positions is presented in Figure 2 [Entry 
16, box 495, folder 72.510].
16
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FIGURE 2
Occupational Titles in Use at Rohwer Relocation Center
Title Total $16  $19 Job Title Description 
Accountant, Cost 4 2 2 Prepares financial statement, audits 
books – Maintenance, Public Works, Ag-
riculture, Trans. & Supply Division.
Controller 1  1 Supervises the financial affairs of Coop-
erative  Enterprise.
Bookkeeper II 1 1  Keeps record of the business transac-
tions – Community Service.
Bookkeeper III 3 3  Keeps record and works on one phase 
of records Administration Division
Accounting Clerk 5 5  Performs the more routine calculat-
ing, typing, and posting necessary in ac-
counting – Administrative, Community 
Service, Co-op Enterprise.
Audit Clerk 3 3  Checks and verifies the figures, calcula-
tions and postings pertaining to various 
transactions Administrative Division.
Cost Clerk II 9 9  Computes the cost of a working unit – 
Public Works, Maintenance, Trans. & 
Supply, Administrative Division.
 Cost accounting methods used at the projects were also sub-
ject to periodic audit by the WRA’s headquarters staff. For ex-
ample, the project director at Gila River sent a letter to Myer 
regarding a recent audit [Entry 16, box 37, folder 12.000]. The 
letter described a number of questions that WRA officials had 
raised, but that Mr. Dodd, the project director, had channeled 
to Myer. The first question and Dodd’s response, reproduced be-
low, illustrate the comprehensiveness of the cost accounting at 
the centers:
1. How are the farm produce costs arrived at from farm 
to mess? Our cost system includes the following 
charges:
(1) direct and indirect labor
(2) materials, such as seeds, fertilizer, sprays, dust, 
etc.
(3) cost of farm employment expenses and opera-
tion
(4) transportation to and from the farm, transporta-
tion of material, and transportation of produce
(5) land and water rentals
(6) miscellaneous expenses such as evacuee office 
wages, office material, etc.
(7) salaries of appointed personnel …
17
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 In summary, WRA officials recognized the importance of 
maintaining detailed records that monitored costs in order to 
justify appropriation requests, promote cost efficiency, and as-
suage critics who charged that evacuees were given favored 
treatment over native citizens in regard to wages, provisions, 
and accommodations during a period of wartime shortages. As 
mentioned, many career WRA officials had cost accounting ex-
perience from prior service at the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and 
the procedures they initiated at the RCs were fully described in 
the government’s Finance Handbook. Instilling a desire among 
captive workers to work in a cost efficient manner was an en-
tirely different matter and one that required a more creative so-
lution. 
 In summary, and from a theory perspective, the decision 
to establish cooperatives and their use of accounting and cost 
controls enabled the WRA to minimize resistance and control 
the labor process in a non-market setting amidst a captive la-
bor force that the WRA could not physically compel to work. 
The next two sections of the paper reviews certain key aspects 
of the interment episode and then highlight how accounting in-
formation was used to monitor and socialize the evacuees.
 
THE INTERNMENT EPISODE: A BRIEF RETROSPECTIVE
 While the internment appears unequivocally reprehensible 
in retrospect, it is noteworthy that the injustice done to citi-
zens of Japanese descent did not go unrecognized by WRA of-
ficials. For example, a WRA booklet of May 1943, entitled “The 
Characteristics of the Project Population, A Handbook of Gen-
eral Statistics,” contained the following introductory comments 
[Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #1]: 
It was about an [sic] year ago that nearly a hundred 
thousand Japanese were suddenly divorced from the 
scheme of things in American society and corralled into 
far-flung desert waste lands while the nation girded it-
self for the supreme task of winning the war. The war 
has obliterated every vestige of individual achievement 
for the whole of the Japanese. Issei and Nisei alike now 
find themselves in the bottom stratum.17
 The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of 
17Issei were native-born Japanese who had emigrated to the U.S. after 1907 
and could not become U.S. citizens by law. Nisei were American-born, Ameri-
can-educated, U.S. citizens of Japanese descent.
18
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Civilians (CWRIC) was established in the early 1980s to re-ex-
amine the internment episode in detail. The CWRIC [1997, p. 
12] held 20 days of hearings, received testimonies from 750 wit-
nesses, and described the losses that were not covered by the 
Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act of 1948 to include, 
“… the stigma placed on people who fell under the exclusion 
and relocation orders; the deprivation of liberty suffered dur-
ing detention; the psychological impact of exclusion and relo-
cation; the breakdown of family structure; the loss of earnings 
or profits; physical injury or illness during detention.”18 The 
CWRIC [1997, p. 18] also concluded that, “the broad historical 
causes which shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war 
hysteria and a failure of political leadership.” It clearly intimat-
ed that racial prejudice was a major driving force, citing Gen-
eral DeWitt’s February 1942 recommendation for forcible exclu-
sion [CWRIC, 1997, p. 6]: 
In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities 
are not served by migration. The Japanese race is an en-
emy race and while many second and third generation 
Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of Unit-
ed States citizenship, have become ‘Americanized,’ the 
racial strains are undiluted.19 
 In terms of the actual relocation, the Wartime Civil Con-
trol Administration (WCCA) preceded the WRA and was charged 
with assembling Japanese-American civilians in 64 civil control 
stations and relocating them to15 regional centers.20 
 Several of these ACs were hastily constructed at near-
by racetracks or fairgrounds where living conditions were de-
plorable. Evacuees were fed and housed there for one to four 
18Russell Robinson, WRA chief of the Evacuee Property Division, estimated 
that the evacuees left behind $200 million worth of real, personal, and commer-
cial property when forced to leave their homes [U.S. Department of the Interior, 
1946e, Entry 1, box 1, p. 108].
19Further to this point were comments by General DeWitt that were quoted 
by the Associated Press on April 13, 1943, during a hearing of the House Naval 
Affairs Subcommittee [Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010 #5]: “It makes no differ-
ence whether the Japanese is theoretically a citizen. He is still a Japanese. Giving 
him a scrap of paper won’t change him. I don’t care what they do with the Japs 
so long as they don’t send them back here. A Jap is a Jap.” Weglyn [1996, p. 28] 
noted that 73% of those interned were American citizens who “were imprisoned 
for no reason other than their race.” Dillon Myer, long-time director of the WRA, 
noted in a speech to the American Legion that 72% of the evacuees had never 
seen Japan [Entry 16, box 471].
20Voluntary relocation outside the WDC ceased as an option at the end of 
March 1942.
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months until permanent camps could be built. The WCCA’s pol-
icies did call for a space allowance of 200 square feet per cou-
ple, food rations not to exceed $.50 per person per day, and a 
yearly clothing allowance that ranged from $25 to $42 depend-
ing on an evacuee’s age and sex. In point of fact, the ACs spent 
on average only $.39 per person per day [CWRIC, 1997, p. 142]. 
Drinnon [1987] observed that by the end of March 1942, over 
90,000 persons were living at ACs where they stayed an aver-
age of 100 days.
 During their residence at these centers, evacuees were as-
signed a family identification number and were required to 
wear regulatory ID tags to identify each family member, their 
personal property, and every transaction involving the exchange 
of goods or services.21 An evacuee’s individuality was routine-
ly compromised by requiring everyone to eat in common mess 
halls and to use common showers, latrines, and laundry facil-
ities. 
 The internment camps were intended to be as self-sustain-
ing as possible given the constraints of a wartime economy and 
the existing prejudice against any policy that appeared to favor 
Japanese evacuees over “native” American citizens. For exam-
ple, evacuee wage rates were capped at $19 per month so that 
they fell below the $21 that was initially paid to American mil-
itary personnel. Milton Eisenhower noted that, “a storm of pro-
tests developed throughout the country about the possibility of 
the evacuees being paid any amount of money greater than the 
amount paid to American soldiers, namely, $21 a month” [En-
try 16, box 53, file 12.202]. 
 By August, 1942, the WRA’s charge also included the dis-
persal and permanent resettlement of evacuees in non-designat-
ed areas of the U.S.22 As of January 1, 1945, just under 32,000 
21Icihasi described the use of identification numbers at his AC: “The Camp 
has a population of 18,400, each of which is numbered for identification; for in-
stance I am No. 5561A, which is required for every transaction in the Camp.” 
Transactions included the purchase of clothing, medical attention, and patron-
age at camp stores and enterprises [Chang, 1997, p. 110].
22In a letter to Eleanor Roosevelt in August 1942, Myer explained the soften-
ing of the original policy [Entry 16, box 429, folder 71.100]: “We strongly believe 
that loyal American citizens among the evacuees should be allowed every oppor-
tunity and encouragement to reenter private employment or enterprise…With 
this in mind I issued about two weeks ago an instruction to our field offices cov-
ering procedures through which individual loyal American citizens of Japanese 
ancestry may be permitted to leave relocation centers to accept private employ-
ment in the middle-western States.”
20
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evacuees had been settled outside the RCs.23 Of these, 14,000 
had gone to the East North Central region which included Chi-
cago and 8,500 to the Mountain states. Interestingly, nearly 
1,500 had been allowed to return to the Western Defense Com-
mand, mostly to Oregon and Washington. The resettlements in-
creased significantly during 1945 when it appeared the war was 
winding down. Only 194 persons had been permitted to go to 
California precedent to 1945; subsequently, 43,181 returned to 
the state that had been the center of Japanese ethnic culture 
before the evacuation outrage [U.S. Department of the Interi-
or, 1946b, Entry 1, box 1, pp. 42-45].
 Table VI of the WPA’s semi-annual report for July 1-Decem-
ber 31, 1944 [Entry 3, box 4] provided interesting place-of-ori-
gin and occupation data for evacuees who had been granted in-
definite departure from the RCs. Of 111,170 original evacuees, 
29.4% had left the RCs. Of the 38,520 foreign-born detainees, 
only 14.23% had departed; the corresponding number for the 
72,650 native-born was 37.55%. With respect to the mobility of 
various occupational groups, it seems that those with middling 
skills were most in demand (e.g., sales/clerical 52.63%, semi-
skilled 42.51%, trained but without specific expertise 41.98%). 
Those with greater expertise followed (e.g., professional and 
managerial 37.56% and skilled 35.02%), while those without 
skills lagged behind in terms of their occupational mobility (e.g., 
unskilled 28.53%, no occupational classification, 22.10%, agri-
culture and fishing 25.19%).24 
 Although the WRA’s staff performed yeoman service in at-
tempting to place evacuees with private industrial and service-
sector firms outside the containment area, bureaucratic delays 
in determining an evacuee’s loyalty and a reluctance to hire 
workers of Japanese ancestry meant that “only a small percent-
age of the internees were able to leave the camps” and be reset-
tled [Robinson, 2001, p. 5]. Typical was a letter G. Richardson, 
head of the Community Enterprises Section, wrote to J.W. Han-
non on October 15, 1942, in which he characterized these ef-
forts in patriotic terms [Entry 16, box 416, folder 69.010 #1]:
23The WRA maintained monthly records on the relocation rate for evacuees 
per 1,000 population. Over the course of 1943, the monthly rates ranged from 
3.9 to 23.6%. These rates ranged from 7.4 to 30.4% and 12.7 to 39.1% for 1944 
and 1945 respectively [U.S. Department of the Interior, 1975, p. 211].
24These percentages are derived by dividing those on indefinite departure on 
December 31, 1944 by the original job classification identified for each evacuee 
in 1942.
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It has been determined that this problem shall be han-
dled in a thoroughly democratic, American way. The 
WRA is cooperating with both military and civilian 
agencies to enable this mass migration to proceed in a 
planned, orderly, and decent manner.
 WRA officials often described relocation and resettlement 
efforts similarly; however, their sentiments are belied by a com-
ment Richardson made trying to place Japanese Americans 
with eastern cooperative groups. He assured Mr. Lincoln, for 
instance, in a December 10, 1942 letter that “… each candidate 
would be thoroughly investigated by the FBI” [Entry 16, box 
416, folder 69.010 #1]. These “democratic” principles are also 
contradicted by the fact that evacuees who failed to answer 
the now infamous Question 28 in the prescribed manner were 
disqualified from relocation.25 However, the WRA’s community 
activities advisors may be cast in a more sympathetic light if 
one considers their efforts to “Americanize” the evacuees for a 
smoother transition to resettlement. For example they secured 
movies for educating evacuees about sections of the country to 
which they might be relocated [Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010 
#4].
 The WRA Handbook [Entry 29, box 1, 30.5.5, 30.5.9] speci-
fied that the prime objective of the WRA’s Community Activities 
Section was to facilitate the relocation process by sponsoring in-
teraction between the evacuees and “groups typically American 
in concept.” RC residents were allowed to participate in “Japa-
nese style games, sports, and cultural activities,” but only if they 
were not specifically nationalistic. Baseball was in; Sumo wres-
tling was out. Likewise, the Community Analysis Section was 
charged with the responsibility to engineer sociological inves-
tigations and to provide programming that was geared toward 
the “assimilation of evacuees into American life” [WRA Hand-
book, Entry 29, box 1, 30.8.1B]. 
 Regardless of their personal motives towards evacuees, 
WRA officials followed the procedures and completed the stand-
ard forms that were specified in the WRA’s Finance Handbook. 
The purpose of the Finance Handbook was “to cover all phas-
es of accounting involved in the activities of the War Reloca-
tion Authority” [Entry 29, box 5, p. A-1]. Thus, the account-
ing and record keeping for both WRA-operated activities (mess 
halls, hospitals, fire and police departments, and agricultural 
25Question 28 was an oath of allegiance to the U.S. It will be discussed in de-
tail in the succeeding section.
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units, among others) and evacuee-managed cooperative enter-
prises (general clothing stores, food and drug stores, shoe re-
pair shops, watch and radio repair shops, etc.) were indicated 
in the Handbook.  
BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING
 Four decades prior to Orwell’s dating of his futuristic vi-
sion, the U.S. government had collected an astounding amount 
of data on the evacuees. Even before the WRA’s statistical divi-
sion was established, the WCCA was gathering information re-
lated to the AC phase of the relocation operation. A letter from 
M.M. Tozier to Myer reviewed the categories of information the 
WCCA was being asked to provide [Entry 16, box 498, file 79.100 
#1]. These included documentary materials taken from evacuees 
at the ACs (e.g., diaries, minutes of evacuee meetings), all AC 
newspapers, vital statistics of all evacuees, reports on AC op-
erations, daily recapitulation reports on the whereabouts of all 
detainees, etc. Subsequently, when the WRA assumed responsi-
bility, a letter sent from Myer to John McCloy, the Assistant Sec-
retary of War [December 5, 1942, Entry 16, box 498, file 79.100 
#1], requested additional information from either the WCCA or 
the War Department. The specifics of the WRA’s informational 
needs are summarized in Appendix A.
 By the end of 1942, the WRA had ceased to depend upon 
the WCCA for its statistical data. B. Ralph Stauber served single-
handedly as the relocation planning officer until he was given 
a small division (Relocation Planning) of his own in 1943, the 
result of a nine-page, single-spaced memo to Myer on Novem-
ber 7, 1942, in which he proposed a statistical division for the 
WRA. His grand design for 1943 was a “locator file” in which 
would appear a Hollerith alphabetic punch card for each evacu-
ee. These cards were to include standard demographic infor-
mation about age, gender, education, occupation, family size, 
medical history, criminal record, and RC location. However, ad-
ditional data categories about links to Japan were also main-
tained, such as years of residence in Japan and the extent of 
education received there. 
 Perhaps the most intrusive statistics were those associated 
with Japanese Americans identified as “repatriates,” either by 
virtue of an evacuee’s application to be sent to Japan and/or by 
a request emanating from the Japanese government [Entry 16, 
box 498, folder 79.100 #1]. The punch card project was so ex-
tensive and immediate that the WRA subcontracted the func-
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tion to IBM. A March 24, 1943 memo from Leland Barrow in-
formed Clear and Stauber that 30,000 locator cards had been 
completed on an initial contract of 40,000 with a final total of 
80,000 expected [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #2]. By April 
9, Stauber complained to the WRA director that the file proj-
ect had been slowed by variations in the data gathering at the 
RCs [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #2].
 Stauber’s 1942 proposal to Myer, envisioning a statistical 
division of the WRA to gather in-depth information on all RC 
operations, was approved in early 1943. These data would in-
clude the physical facilities of each, with particular attention to 
the number of available apartments for evacuee living. At the 
Rohwer Center, for example, the 1,050 single persons all lived 
in six-person units [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #1]. Agri-
cultural and industrial statistics were kept on operations and 
individuals, as were records of those evacuees who worked off 
the RCs and the payments made to them. The cost of subsis-
tence payments and clothing allowances was maintained, lead-
ing to “profit and loss” statements for each project (Entry 16, 
box 498, folder 79.100 #1).
 Additional information on evacuees included lists of visi-
tors to the RCs and those who were visited [Entry 16, box 498, 
folder 79.100 #1]; data on short and long-term leave hearings 
for educational, occupational, and relocation purposes [Entry 
16, box 498, folder 79.100 #3]; and background details on the 
characteristics of those evacuees confined to the centers’ stock-
ades [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #4]. “Gallup Poll” inquir-
ies were regularly solicited to gauge evacuee opinion on an as-
sortment of issues [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #1]. The 
WRA wanted to differentiate the attitudes of the Kibei, Japa-
nese Americans who had been educated in Japan, from the Ni-
sei and Issei. What were the characteristics of the repatriates, 
both those who wanted to emigrate to Japan and those whom 
the Japanese government had specified for return? Did evacuee 
reactions change as their internment lengthened? Were there at-
titudinal variations among the occupants of various RCs? How 
did those who sought employment relocation differ from those 
who did not [Stauber to Myer, November 7, 1942, Entry 16, box 
498, folder 79.100 #1]? Based upon these and other questions, 
an “Analysis Unit” was formed as a component of the Reloca-
tion Planning Division of the WRA. The analytical and estima-
tion activities of this unit are summarized in a letter from its 
head, Evelyn Rose, to Stauber in October 1943 [Entry 316, box 
498, folder 79.100 #3].
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 On March 7, 1944, a new handbook of statistical proce-
dures was sent by Stauber to all project directors. This resulted 
in a new reporting system which was operationalized on April 
1 [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #4]. In a letter from Stau-
ber to R.R. Best at the Tule Lake Center on April 23, 1944, the 
head of the Relocation Planning Division prioritized the infor-
mation required by the Washington office [Entry 16, box 498, 
folder 79.100 #4]. It will be seen below that Tule Lake housed 
those evacuees considered the most dangerous by the govern-
ment. See Appendix B for details of this prioritization with ac-
companying references to the new manual.
 While much of this wealth of information was amassed to 
improve the internment process irrespective of its inherent im-
morality, the outcomes did not always reflect benevolence. Myer 
wrote to Senator Holman on June 21, 1943, disclosing the num-
ber of native-born Japanese Americans 17 years and older who 
had “declined to subscribe to an oath of allegiance”; namely, 
“Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of 
America and foreswear any form of allegiance to the Japanese 
emperor, or any other foreign government, power or organiza-
tion?” The WRA had sufficient information to report that 79% 
had so sworn and 21% had refused [Entry 16, box 498, folder 
79.100 #2]. Subsequently, the wording of this infamous “Ques-
tion 28” was “rephrased to read whether they would abide by 
the nation’s laws and refrain from interfering with the war ef-
fort” [Myer speech to the American Legion, November 16, 1943, 
Entry 16, box 471]. A later statistic, reported by the U.S. De-
partment of the Interior [1946c] after the war, had only 11% of 
the evacuees declining to swear the oath.26
 The oath of allegiance, combined with information regard-
ing those Japanese Americans requesting repatriation, formed 
the basis for a heinous process known as “segregation” that ad-
umbrated the advent of McCarthyism a decade later with an ad-
ditional leavening of racism and xenophobia. Segregated at the 
Tule Lake Center were those evacuees, along with one or two 
immediate family members, who failed to respond affirmative-
ly to Question 28 and/or those viewed as potentially interfering 
26The WRA Handbook [Entry 29, box 1, 60.4.3B] was very specific as to 
which evacuees would be eligible for permanent relocation out of the camps. 
First and foremost was the need for an “unqualified affirmative” to Question 28. 
Additionally, Japanese-American male citizens were eligible only if they had not 
lived in Japan for ten years of more after age six, had not received all or most of 
their education in Japan, and had received no formal education in Japan after 
the age 15. 
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with the war effort [Myer speech to the American Legion, No-
vember 16, 1943, Entry 16, box 471].27 
 The discussion of the WRA’s data gathering efforts hereto-
fore has suggested several reasons for this time-consuming and 
expensive undertaking. In the first instance, the WRA was the 
servant of government and, as such, was required to provide 
sufficient data to demonstrate that the captive population was 
maintained efficiently and cost effectively. In some instances, 
comparative statistics from the ten RCs were required for gaug-
ing the relative competency of their individual managements. 
As an agent of government also, the WRA had to pay particu-
lar attention to those Japanese Americans whom the state per-
ceived to be the most dangerous – the Kibei, the repatriates, 
those who had declined the oath of allegiance, and those who 
were segregated.
 In other instances, the statistical collection had the poten-
tial for improving life on the RCs specifically as attitudinal data 
were gathered and analyzed. Information about the evacuees 
was provided to academics, such as Leonard Blum of UCLA and 
D.S. Thomas of UC Berkeley, for psychological, sociological, and 
statistical study. The distinguished American author and Japa-
nese-Hawaiian advocate, Edgar Rice Burroughs, requested and 
received information about evacuee mobility from the RCs to 
employment opportunities further east [Entry 16, box 498, fold-
er 79.100 #3]. Ultimately, however, it was the economic data the 
WRA collected on the cooperative enterprises operating on the 
RCs that benefited the evacuees most directly.
 The State Department had a distinct interest in the WRA’s 
statistical operations. In November 1943, the State Department 
wrote Myer to the effect that it might need detailed informa-
tion about the costs of Japanese-American detention if post-war 
negotiations took a particular direction. Stauber informed the 
WRA leadership that the Relocation Planning Division was al-
ready compiling those costs. Myer wrote to Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull on December 8, 1943: “The system of statistical 
records and cost accounts provided in the regular operating 
procedures in the War Relocation Authority appear to be ade-
quate to furnish the information requested …” [Entry 16, box 
498, folder 79.100 #3].
 A related and interesting observation was made by Myer 
27Evidence in Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #3 suggests that correlations 
between Question 28 declinations and repatriation requests were made routine-
ly, even when segregation was not at issue.
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in his November 1943 speech to the American Legion when he 
averred that it was his feeling that the WRA had to do all it 
could to make life bearable on the RCs lest the Japanese mili-
tarists take retaliatory actions against American prisoners of 
war [Entry 16, box 471].
 The archive also reveals an exchange of information be-
tween the WRA and several foreign governments. A letter from 
Stauber to Hector Allard, the secretary of the Canadian lega-
tion in Washington, proposed a reciprocal exchange of informa-
tion and visitation to Canadian operations that paralleled the 
RCs [October 13, 1942, Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #1]. In 
particular, Stauber was interested in hearing about conditions 
the Canadian government imposed upon employers of evacu-
ee labor. Additionally, there is evidence of the Spanish govern-
ment’s interest in the operation of the RCs and the utilization 
of a captive labor force. The repressive Franco regime is re-
puted to have employed convict labor in the aftermath of the 
Spanish Civil War. A letter from Stauber to John Provinse, the 
chief of the Community Management Division, requested data 
in preparation for a 1944 visit to the RCs by the Spanish Em-
bassy under the auspices of the State Department [Entry 16, 
box 417, folder 69.010 #5].
 We should also point out that the WRA maintained dai-
ly time reports for all evacuee workers, some 2,500 to 3,000 
at each center. A post-war conclusion with respect to their ef- 
ficiency was discouraging. Although the average working day 
was seven to eight hours of on-the-job presence, the WRA felt 
it was getting only two to three hours of performance [U.S. De-
partment of the Interior, 1946c, Entry 1, box 1, pp. 32-34]. If 
this analysis is correct, it could suggest that the cooperatives 
may have provided sufficient incentives to make them a superior 
labor control structure than the direct hiring of labor at low 
wages, which was the only recourse for the WRA. However, it 
is conceded that no evidence exists in the archives of the work 
performance of cooperative employees; thus, any comparison to 
the WRA’s direct hires in terms of their relative efficiency must 
be pure conjecture.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 In our view, the need to house, care for, and sustain thou-
sands of captive workers in semi-permanent centers convinced 
top WRA officials that cooperative enterprises would be the or-
ganizational form that would best overcome worker resistance, 
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provide positive incentives, and promote cost efficiency in the 
non-market environment of RCs. A letter on October 9, 1942 
from E.R. Fryer, acting project director (Gila River) to Philip 
M. Glick, the WRA’s solicitor, reveals the thinking behind coop-
eratives. It is most helpful in illuminating the WRA’s underly-
ing rationales implementing this structure [Entry 16, box 495, 
folder 72.510]:
We are obligated not only by virtue of our commit-
ments but even more so by our position as guardians to 
take every possible action to maintain and, in fact, pro- 
mote economic respectability. Otherwise, not only will 
we fail in our efforts during war time to preserve hu-
man values but in the difficult post-war period we shall 
have on our hands a great American minority that shall 
have lost some of its most admirable qualities. On the 
purely practical side, industrial and agricultural enter-
prises will fail if we do not by some means make our 
people a living, vital part of them. Otherwise, each 
evacuee will generate inevitably into a $16 or $19 work-
er. Here at Gila we are about within two weeks – to 
launch a net enterprise. We certainly don’t want a rep-
etition of Manzanar – strikes, sit-downs, bitterness, 
charges and counter-charges. It is clearly within our 
power to dignify the ‘net’ enterprise. We can easily give 
it all the vitality needed. We need to make it a Commu-
nity Enterprise with the proceeds deposited into a com-
munity trust fund for the benefit of all members of the 
work corps shared in proportion to their man-days of 
work. 
 It is especially noteworthy to observe that top WRA admin-
istrators discussed the use of non-economic (i.e., social) incen-
tives as a way to stimulate evacuee work performance and bring 
vitality to the cooperative enterprises. On September 1, 1942, 
Director Myer issued Administrative Instruction No. 27 on the 
subject of Employment and Compensation [Entry 16, box 495, 
folder 72.510].28 This Instruction contained the most detailed 
policy statement to date and included such items as basic pol-
ices, compensation and work rules, employment in consumer 
enterprises and the private sector, and unemployment compen-
sation. It reaffirmed that all employment would be voluntary, 
but went on to describe the social inducements that would be 
28The CWRIC [1997, p. 167] noted: “The new policy adopted in August 
[1942] remained substantially unchanged throughout the WRA program.”
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used to promote work effort and desired behaviors. Section II, 
“The Work Relocation Works Corps and The Order of Merit,” 
and Section III, “Merit Rating Board,” are reproduced in Fig-
ure 3:
FIGURE 3
Administrative Instruction No. 27
II The War Relocation Works Corps [WRWC] and The Order of Merit
A. The Work Corps was designed to place in the hands of the evacuees an 
instrument of organization understood by the American people, and an 
organization which can focus attention on work for the public good and 
will give recognition to evacuees.
B. Each evacuee, upon first being assigned to a job, shall become there-
by enlisted in the WRWC…Upon completion of three months’ employ-
ment, if his conduct and quality and quantity of his work for that period 
are certified to the Project Director as outstanding by the Merit Rating 
Board, an evacuee may be cited by the Project Director for special rec-
ognition and be made a member of the Order of Merit which is herby es-
tablished as a unit within the WRWC. The Merit Rating Board may rec-
ommend that such merit recognition shall be withdrawn, for cause, and 
the Project Director may, upon such recommendation, terminate the 
membership of an evacuee in the Order of Merit.
C. Preferential consideration shall be given to members of the Order of 
merit in connection with leaves for private employment, assignment to 
preferred types of employment within the relocation center, promotion 
to supervisory positions, and in such other matters as the Project Direc-
tor may consider appropriate, in recognition of the superior initiative, 
efficiency, leadership and loyalty of evacuees who achieve in the Order 
of Merit.
III Merit Rating Board
A. There shall be on each relocation center a Merit Rating Board of sev-
en members, appointed by the Community Council. Members of the Ad-
ministrative Staff may serve on the Board if requested to do so by the 
Community Council. This Board may be assigned a full-time evacuee 
secretary.
B. The Merit Rating Board shall develop and install a simple work report 
to be made periodically by each supervisor for members of the Work 
Corps working under his direction. This work report shall cover quality 
of work, quantity of work, and conduct. (Attitude, punctuality, loyalty to 
the United States, etc. shall be considered as part of conduct.)
C. The Merit Rating Board shall constantly seek all proper work incentives 
by planning awards and recognition and may make appropriate recom-
mendations, from time to time, to the Project Director.
 The most interesting aspect of Instruction No. 27 is its 
 reliance on non-market factors to spur work effort and recog-
nize achievement. For example, a Merit Rating Board, com-
prised of evacuees, would evaluate the conduct, quantity, and 
quality of an evacuee’s work. Superior performance would re-
sult in membership in a select “Order of Merit,” which included 
benefits such as job promotion and leaves for private employ-
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ment outside of the center. In essence, therefore, cooperative as-
sociations provided a structure for labor control through peer 
monitoring and evaluation.
 Another point of interest in Instruction No. 27 is the call 
for evacuees to demonstrate loyalty and patriotism to the U.S. 
In retrospect, the idea that captive workers would be expected 
to express loyalty to their captors seems almost ludicrous, but 
Japanese Americans were widely mistrusted in the early 1940s 
and were subjected to frequent and overt acts of racial preju-
dice, especially in the months immediately following Pearl Har-
bor. WRA officials believed that displaying acts of loyalty to the 
war effort, such as putting forth a full-day’s work effort and lat-
er volunteering for military service, would help the evacuees ob-
tain employment and join the mainstream of American life.
 In essence, evacuees had far fewer options than native 
workers in utilizing their labor power despite severe wartime la-
bor shortages. Evacuee wages were capped; evacuees were forc-
ibly relocated and detained at remote locations. They were un-
able to pursue other opportunities to leverage their bargaining 
position in regard to wages and work conditions. On the other 
hand, evacuees were not slaves or convicts, and they could not 
be physically compelled to work, in part because of the gov-
ernment’s intent to abide by the terms of the Geneva Conven-
tion.29 Evacuees were provided with basic necessities whether 
they worked or not, so the economic motives for work effort 
(e.g., resources necessary for food, clothing, and shelter) were 
essentially nonexistent.30 Given these unique circumstances, the 
29Glick discussed the reasons against work compulsion: “It is probably im-
possible to compel Japanese to work against their will. While their detention can 
be shown to relate to the National safety as a war measure, the product of their 
work would be in no different category from the standpoint of war need than the 
product of the work of any other American citizen. Furthermore, it would be un-
wise to attempt to compel them to work in view of present negotiations between 
the State Department and the Japanese Government, under which the Geneva 
Convention of 1929 regarding treatment of prisoners of war would be extended 
to civilian internees and under which the compulsory labor of civilian internees 
would be prohibited. It is not expected that the lack of authority to compel labor 
will be a practical obstacle in view of the administrative devices of preferential 
treatment that can be used” [Entry 16, box 225, folder 31.000].
30A February 19, 1943 memorandum from Taizo Inazu, president of the 
Board of Directors of the Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises, to Dr. William. J. 
Bruce, superintendent of the Consumer Enterprises Division, listed ten points 
 indicating why the WRA should lessen the financial burden on cooperatives. 
Point number 6 reveals the incentive problems the WRA constantly faced: “It is 
felt by the residents that the Cooperative is a division of the WRA set-up to serve 
the interests of the residents” [Entry 48, box 228, folder 69.030].
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WRA felt that cooperatives would be the most effective and cost 
efficient way to control the labor process. Philip M. Glick, so-
licitor of the WRA, described why cooperative enterprises were 
selected [Entry 16, box 225, folder 31.000]:
The lack of power to compel Japanese to work without 
their consent may not, however, be a serious obstacle to 
carrying out the Authority’s plans for work programs. 
Most of them will likely prefer work to idleness, par-
ticularly where an increase in income is assured. The 
Authority can provide other inducements. Coopera-
tion in the work program as a sign of patriotism and 
loyalty can be stressed. It can be rewarded through 
various types of awards, insignia, or preferential treat-
ment. Lack of cooperation can be discouraged through 
various administrative devices, including, if necessary, 
withdrawal of privileges and denial of more than bare 
subsistence.
 Ultimately, a full understanding of the success of the WRA 
cooperative associations transcends both labor process and ac-
counting, lying instead with both the culture of the Japanese-
American community and the demands of a wartime economy. 
Rather than sustaining resistance that would have caused any 
managerial system to fail, Japanese-American evacuees general-
ly portrayed a voluntarism that reflected itself in a commitment 
to hard work and a patriotism in light of the severest adversi-
ty best exemplified by the 442nd, the most decorated battalion 
of American soldiers in World War II, whose bravery belied the 
atrocities committed by the American government against civil-
ians who shared their ethnicity.31 
 We are unable to conclude that the WRA’s policies, includ-
ing the decision to establish cooperative enterprises, were inor-
dinately successful. However, the evacuees’ spirit of voluntarism 
and active support of cooperative associations enabled WRA 
 officials to act relatively humanely towards the detained Japa-
nese civilians, although these officials were not immune from 
obtaining benefits from the wage ceiling which was imposed 
on evacuees.32 The few documented cases of civil disobedience 
31Myer, in his speech to the American Legion, mentioned the exemplary ser-
vice record of the 442nd [Entry 16, box 471].
32For example, a letter on April 13, 1943 from Paul A. Taylor, project director 
(Jerome), to D.S. Myer (subject: rates for personal services of evacuees working 
for the appointed personnel) is most revealing [Entry 16, box 495, folder 72.500]: 
“The appointed personnel at the Jerome Project have expressed a need for the 
services of a few evacuees to work in their homes as housekeepers, cooks and 
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and the evacuees’ willingness to staff key managerial positions 
despite receiving wages far below market suggest that coopera-
tive associations enabled the WRA to use non-economic in- 
centives and to avoid physical punishments that typified earli-
er captive worker environments. That said, it is impossible to 
parcel out the impact of the cooperative business structure on 
the response of the Japanese-American evacuee population to 
their forced confinement.
 We can conclude, however, that the accounting informa-
tion and control procedures played a critical role in the intern-
ment episode. The WRA had to justify its policies continually 
and publicly and to minimize expenditures during a period of 
severe wartime shortages. The Finance Handbook contained the 
set of templates for recording transactions and creating reports 
that enabled top officials to compare the centers’ performance 
and monitor their operations. Compiling average daily meal cost 
figures and creating an elaborate system of repayment for gov-
ernment advances are two examples of the procedures which 
promoted cost efficiency. Thus, in conjunction with the social 
mechanisms associated with cooperative business enterprises, 
accounting played a key role in the management and adminis-
tration of the RCs.
 We would not be relating the full story of the Japanese-
American evacuation unless we provide the WRA the opportu-
nity to deliver its final verdict on the relocation program that it 
directed [U.S. Department of the Interior, 1946d, Entry 1, box 
1, p. 99]:
While some of the evacuees will never recover from 
the bitter experiences of the evacuation, the Authori-
ty is convinced that because of the industry and integri-
ty of the Japanese American, they will quickly build for 
themselves a better social and economic pattern than 
they had before the war.
nurse maids. I would like authorization for an acceptable full and part-time rate 
that the appointed personnel should pay for this service. I would suggest that a 
rate be established on the following basis:
 (192 Hour Basis)
 Per Hour Per Month
 $.0833 (A) 16.00 – wage paid to evacuee worker 
    by appointed personnel
  .1510 (B) 19.00 – subsistence ) Paid by
   3.50 – clothing allowance ) appointed
  (B) 6.50 – quarters ) personnel
   –––– ) to WRA
 $.2343  $45.00 – Total paid by appointed personnel”
32
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 It is our conviction that with these words the WRA was put-
ting a much too favorable spin upon the whole relocation ep-
isode, which remains one of the most shameful events in race 
relations in the recent history of the United States. The best 
that can be said for the WRA’s participation is that the record 
seems to indicate that the agency generally did the best it could 
to make the process as palatable as possible for the oppressed 
ethnic minority. Yet, it cannot be forgotten that the WRA was 
an arm of the government and the military establishment that 
had orchestrated this abomination.
 In conclusion, we believe that there are innumerable oppor-
tunities to extend this line of research and examine the role of 
accounting for repressed or captive workers in other non-mar-
ket settings. One of the most intriguing areas for study is the 
accounting for convict labor which was common in Australia 
in the mid-1800s and throughout the U.S. South after the Civil 
War and well into the early 1900s. Many interesting questions 
arise regarding leases of human capital. For example, how were 
these leases structured? What role did accounting play in jus-
tifying punishments for failing to meet predetermined task lev-
els? What kinds of accounting information were used by outside 
contractors who supervised production and marketed convict-
made goods? Answering these and related questions will illu-
minate accounting’s role in controlling the labor process of re-
pressed and/or captive workers.
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APPENDIX A
Information Requested by D.C. Myer from the War Department  
(January 1943)
A) Records or Documents Concerning the WCCA Program
1) AC populations (age, sex, occupation, family size, place of original resi-
dence, place of origin, RC to which sent
2) daily recapitulation reports (nos. 1-12, 44-46, 52-54, 113, 127, 133-34, 
any issued after 142
3) addresses of individual evacuees at different stages of the program
4) property records of the WCCA covering assistance to evacuees in con-
junction with property management and disposal in cooperation with 
the Farm Security Administration and the Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco
 5) social data registration schedule (WCCA Form S-3)
6) copies of records, correspondence, applications, or declinations related 
to repatriation
7) vital statistics during the assembly center stage
8) information on sick, insane, deaf, dumb, blind, crippled evacuees
9) case records of evacuees hospitalized or other medical treatment at the 
ACs
B) Reports or Information Concerning Individual Evacuees
1) visitor-visitee file kept by WCCA
2) individuals sent to RCs from ACs ahead of schedule and reasons
3) individuals released from ACs and reasons
4) information about transfers to reunite families
5) records of those with a “shady past” or those who obstructed administra-
tion, or those with “bad performance at ACs
6) names of students given leave and institutions attending
7) evacuees from Alaska and reasons for evacuation
C) Reports or Information on Special Situations or Conditions
1) report on Santa Anita riot – causes, names, actions taken
2) other specific difficulties in ACs or RCs
D) Information Concerning Physical Facilities and Plant Operation
1) reports of engineers on facilities at RCs (sewers, electricity, water) – ade-
quacy 
2) information on equipment and supplies
3) relief grants and clothing allowances pending at time of transfer from AC 
to RC
E) Observations or Comments on Various General Phases of AC Operations
1) reports of the WCCA on the entirety of assembly centers operations
2) evacuee governance at assembly centers – recent shift from self-govern-
ance (discontinued) to advisory councils, why the change, conditions 
that led to the change
3) most cooperative and uncooperative groups or organizations of evacuees 
at the ACs  
4) offenses committed and how they were dealt with 
Source: letter from Myer to John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War [January 5, 
1943, Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #1]
35
Tyson and Fleischman: Accounting for interned Japanese-American civilians during World War II: Creating incentives and establishing controls for captive workers
Published by eGrove, 2006
Accounting Historians Journal, June 2006202  
APPENDIX B
Principal Items or Classes of Information Needed  
by the Relocation Planning Division
1a. Material called for in the manual regarding the Census of March 31 (manual 
50.8.6)
1b. Population distribution by age, sex, citizenship at 3 months intervals back to 
the beginning of the project
2. Current population reports daily, weekly, and monthly (manual 50.8.2-5)
3. Special information incident to clarifying and correcting records, and clari-
fying of particular evacuee cases, etc.
3a. Queries from the Central Utah Laboratory to facilitate completion of our 
Central records
3b. Listing of unauthorized residents of Tule Lake for purpose of clarifying sta-
tus through interview, hearings, etc.
3c. Cleaning up the residual of incomplete repatriation applications
3d. Supplying corrected lists of seasonal leaves transferred or pending to other 
projects
4. Completing lists of aliens in residence, particularly those transferred to Tule 
Lake in the segregation movements.
5. Maintaining a current integrated set of records including a locator file, an 
evacuee case file, and special records (manual 50.8.1 B(4))
6. Consultative services to Project offices, including review of monthly reports 
for accuracy, completeness, and comparability of statistical data (manual 
50.8.8)
7. Analysis services, analysis and interpretation of statistical data pertaining to 
evacuees (manual 50.8.7).
7a. Analysis of repatriation applications, giving classification by such factors as 
age, sex, citizenship, year and method of entry into the U.S., residence and 
schooling in Japan, etc.
7b. Information concerning stockade residents (many information categories 
specified)
7c. Kibei: the number of the so-called “1940 Kibei,” that is, Kibei who are un-
married, whose families are not in the U.S. since 1935, by age, sex, years in 
Japan, number requesting repatriation, etc.
7d. Inductees
7e. Project employment – distribution of employment – number of families hav-
ing one or more wage earners – relation of employment status to welfare 
load – nature and origin of welfare relief cases (drawn predominately from 
what groups)
8. Auxiliary reports
8a. Check list of segregee movements to Tule Lake, giving dates of each move-
ment and number transferred, by age (under and over17), sex, citizenship, 
reason for segregation
8b. Check list of non-segregee movements out of Tule giving date, and number 
of  evacuees, by age (under and over 17), sex, and citizenship
8c. Prompt return of receipted train lists
Highest priority items are identified as 7c, 7b, 7d, and 7a in that order. 7e will 
take time with immediacy depending upon project considerations. 1a, 1b, 2, 5, 6, 
and 8c are to be handled routinely. 3 is to be handled as circumstances require. 4 
must be kept completely current to meet commitments. 8a and 8b are small jobs. 
8c must be dealt with promptly.
Source: Stauber to Best, April 28, 1944 [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #4]
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